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Abstract
Democracies are thought to behave differently than other states when cooperating
in alliances, organizations, trade, and a host of other international institutions. We
contend, however, that these democratic differences largely depend upon geopoliti-
cal environments that make cooperation possible. Though studies have demonstrated
endogeneity between democracy and peace, few analyze the effects of this joint rela-
tionship on democratic differences in cooperative foreign policy behavior. We address
this using the alliance literature as an example. We argue that alliances are used to
either deter aggression or serve as conduits to advance other goals. Alliances that de-
ter occur in dangerous environments, while those that serve other purposes cluster in
peaceful environments. We find that alliances used to deter are particularly unreliable
“scraps of paper”, and that the general reliability of alliances is concentrated among
those existing in already-peaceful environments, which are unlikely to be invoked. By
jointly modeling regime type and political environment using data on alliance termina-
tion from 1920–2001, we show that alliance reliability is a function of the latter rather
than the former. Our argument has important ramifications for a host of literatures
focused on regime type, as well as current debates over the effectiveness of democratic
deterrence.
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Since the establishment of the empirical finding that democracies rarely fight one another,
many studies have sought confirmation of democratic differences in other types of empirical
relationships. Democracies are thought to trade more with other democracies, are more likely
to form and cooperate in intergovernmental organizations, and are more likely to ally with
each other and be reliable partners. These are just a few examples of the larger democratic
peace research program.
We believe these types of inferences are unwarranted, however, since the explanations
often miss an important point: democracies tend to be clustered across the globe in mostly
peaceful regions. As democratization is more likely in peaceful environments, analyses exam-
ining any type of democratic difference must be careful to separate the independent causal
effect of democracy on political outcomes from that of the political environment. Since
democracy is itself at least partially determined by the political environment, a failure to
model both the direct and indirect effect of the political environment on policy outcomes
will incorrectly attribute the indirect effect of the political environment to democratic insti-
tutions. This, in turn, makes it easier to find statistically significant differences in foreign
policy behaviors across regime types. We argue that once the political environment is ac-
counted for—and this source of bias is eliminated—many of the differences in foreign policy
behavior between regime types will be eliminated.
We focus our analysis on democratic differences in alliance behavior, and build on a
recent study finding democracies to be more reliable partners. Our basic argument is that
states use alliances to either (a) counter threats or (b) perform other functions, and that
the former are less likely to be honored. An a-type alliance may also be re-purposed as
a b-type once the intial threat has subsided. This classification of alliances has important
implications on assessing the relationship between democracy and alliance violations: a-type
alliances that successfully deter threats produce peaceful environments, which encourages
democratization, resulting in the alliance being either re-purposed as a b-type or allowed to
expire. Thus, only a-type alliance are “at-risk” of violating their alliances; since b-types do
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not face external threats, their obligations are unlikely to be invoked. As democracies make
up a disproportionate proportion of b-type alliances, and democracies are more likely to arise
in more peaceful political environments, a failure to appropriately model threat environment
results in a conflation of the effect of regime type with that of the geopolitical environment.
We address this by using a split-population logit with an instrumental variable to model
the likelihood of conflict during the duration of an alliance, and introduce this likelihood
into the study of democratic reliability. The split-population model allows us to statisti-
cally account for the risk of alliance invocation, and subsequent potential abrogation, due to
the political environment, while the instrumental variable accounts for possible endogeneity
between alliance reliability and threat environment. We find that the association between
democracy and alliance reliability appears to actually be a function of the political envi-
ronment facing the state. Further, our analyses suggest the combined, threat-and-reliability
model outperforms the reliability model alone.
Our argument should apply to other ancillary findings suggesting democratic differences
as well. Any time peace affects cooperation—whether it is trade, institutions, or similar
types of cooperation—the endogeneity we document will pose problems for confirming that
democracies behave differently. We begin our argument in the next section with a brief
review of the democracy and alliance literature.
Alliance behavior
Traditional alliance theory is replete with arguments that threats to the state cause alliance
making in order to deter aggressors. Morgenthau (1960) called it external balancing: faced
with threat and unable to respond quickly enough with an increase in internal capability,
leaders sought partners in other states to help them avoid, or survive, against external threats
to their sovereignty. Alliance-making in this manner forms a key component of traditional
realist theory (see also, Waltz 1979; Walt 1985), and most empirical studies find that threats
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do matter in determining whether alliances form (Siverson and Emmons 1991; Lai and Reiter
2000; Johnson 2017). The implication of these arguments and findings is that alliances covary
with threat, and, when threat diminishes, the need for the alliance does as well. Alliances
are, as the famous phrase puts it, “scraps of paper” to be torn as situations change.
Not all alliances, however, are responses to threat. Instead, alliances may be used to
facilitate a number of different tasks (Schroeder 1976; Altfeld 1984). Alliances, for example,
may be an instrument used to resolve contentious issues (Gibler 1996, 1997; Weitsman 2004;
Mattes and Vonnahme 2010). Alliances may also be used as a method of gaining influence
over smaller states (Morrow 1991; Lake 2009; Johnson 2015). We refer to the traditional,
power-aggregating alliances as a-types and those formed for other purposes as b-types.
Consistently identifying these different types of alliances ex ante, however, has proven
difficult. The empirical focus has been on either specific issues, such as territorial settlement
treaties, or the presence of asymmetric capabilities within the alliance. Classifying alliances
in this way, however, negates cases where alliances are mutually implicated, at least to
varying degrees. The former requires that alliances which resolve issues, such as the 1887
pact between Prussia and Russia or the 1960 USSR and China alliance, are not also, at least
in part, power aggregating.1 The latter forces an assumption that some trade-off between
capabilities and autonomy is the primary reason for why major powers would partner with
minor powers that offer little in the way of additional military capabilities.2
Democracies in alliance
Related to the two general alliance types has been the growth of studies associating democ-
racies with alliance behavior that is quite different from traditional alliance theory expecta-
tions. Democracies may engage in deterrent alliances, for example, but their commitments
1The Prussia-Russia alliance addressed disputes in the Balkans and the Dardanelles, while the USSR-
China alliance resolved a border dispute between the two parties (Gibler 1997).
2While asymmetric alliances may be an effort to “buy influence” from the perspective of major powers,
they can also provide access and basing rights necessary to confront distant adversaries. From the perspective
of minor powers, these arrangements do supplement their security (McManus 2018) and increase the minor
power’s bargaining position vis-a`-vis rivals in disputes (Langlois 2012).
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are seemingly not scraps of paper. Their commitments are more likely to deter other states
and, when threatened, to be honored by the democracies involved.
The theoretical argument for this has focused on the idea that cooperation is more likely
among similar types of states. Leeds (1999), for example, develops a model where coop-
eration is essentially a method of policy coordination, and leaders consider the likelihood
of agreement fulfillment—foreign policy changes—when forming or proposing cooperation.
Without the likelihood of fulfillment by the other actor, then there is little incentive to alter
state policies when it will not be reciprocated. These audience costs seemingly make it more
likely that democracies make better alliances and have longer-lasting cooperation.
A number of studies have empirically analyzed whether pairs of democracies tended to
“flock together”. Siverson and Emmons (1991) found some evidence that democracies were
more likely to form alliances with other democracies, but there were strong period effects.
The finding was consistent in the post-World War II era data, but not prior (see also Kimball
2006). Lai and Reiter (2000) revisited this empirical claim and found a strong relationship
for joint threats to the dyad. Jointly-democratic dyads were more likely to be involved in
defense pacts than mixed or fully non-democratic dyads, and regime similarity systematically
predicted both defense pacts and other types of commitments in the dyad.3
Alliances composed of jointly democratic states also appear to last longer than those
comprised of other types of states. Gaubatz (1996) found that jointly democratic alliance
dyads lasted twice as long as other alliance dyads. There was no empirical difference, how-
ever, between mixed-regime and non-democratic dyads. This led Gaubatz (1996, 135) to
conclude, “democracy by itself does not appear to either increase or decrease the ability of
a state to make commitments to nondemocracies.” Bennett (1997), using the same data,
took the average number of liberal regimes in an alliance and found a positive, statistically
significant effect increased alliance duration. The substantive effects were especially strong,
3McManus and Yarhi-Milo (2017) suggest that while democracies are more likely to engage in public
acts of support, their cooperation with autocracies is often less public in order to avoid domestic backlash.
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since all-liberal alliances increase the duration of an average alliance by almost fifteen years.4
Finally, democratic states have also been found to be more reliable alliance partners than
nondemocracies. When confronted with threats to the alliance, democracies are more likely
to honor the provisions of their alliances because their leaders risk sanction by their publics
when reneging. Thus, among all the states in alliances, democracies are expected to be better
partners—more reliable, less likely to terminate their alliances, and less likely to violate the
terms of the agreement (Leeds 2003; Leeds and Savun 2007; Leeds, Mattes and Vogel 2009).
Do political institutions explain these differences?
Some evidence suggests that democratic differences in alliance behavior may be less well
understood than it appears. For example, regarding alliance formation, Gibler and Wolford
(2006) questioned the research design used by both Siverson and Emmons (1991) and Lai and
Reiter (2000). Gibler and Wolford argued that these studies were not technically examining
alliance formation but were instead identifying whether dyads were allied. By switching the
analysis from whether a dyad was allied in a given year to focusing on a dyad at the time of
alliance formation, Gibler and Wolford demonstrated that democracies were not more likely
to form alliances; instead, states were becoming democratic after having formed an alliance.
Gibler and Wolford’s (2006) analysis also showed that the peace provided from the de-
terring effect of large, regional defense pacts promoted the development of democracy. In
fact, over 90% of jointly-democratic alliance-dyads exist within three broad, regional defense
pacts: NATO (55%), OAS (29%), and the WEU (7%). The regional clustering associated
with these regional defense pacts confirmed a more complicated relationship between democ-
racies and alliance-making. It also hints that the distribution of democracies in alliance is
at least partially determined by something within their political environment.
This finding raises questions about the reliability of other alliance outcomes associated
with democracy. For example, given the logic of cooperation among similar regime types
4It is worth noting that only a handful of alliances (less than 1% of the data) were comprised solely of
democratic states at the time of alliance formation.
5
outlined by Leeds (1999) and Lai and Reiter (2000), it is clear why democracies may be more
reliable allies with other democracies, but it is less clear why democracies would unilaterally
restrict their options when interacting with nondemocracies given the latter’s expected higher
degree of defection. While democratic states may simply be less willing than nondemocracies
to break their international agreements, this commitment is not evident in other policy areas.
Democracies do not, for example, honor their monetary commitments (Simmons 2000), nor
their territorial treaties (Chyzh 2014), more than other regime types. Moreover, Gartzke
and Gleditsch (2004) looked at whether alliance partners intervene in response to their
obligations and found that democracies were actually less reliable than other states. Taken
together, these additional results suggest that differences in alliance behavior often attributed
to domestic institutions may instead be driven by some omitted factor.
Peaceful environments and democracy
One potentially omitted factor is the political environment around a state: specifically, how
threatening a political environment is may shape a state’s foreign policy behavior (Vasquez
2009). For example, alliance formation is often observed by states in order to counteract a
threat (Kimball 2006; Johnson 2017). Yet, peace—or the lack of threat—encourages or even
causes democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Gleditsch 2009; Gibler 2012). This creates a
puzzle in terms of alliance behavior because, without a threat, democratic states should have
no need for alliances. Nevertheless, democracies do make and maintain alliances.
Peace causing democracy is not a new argument, of course, and has developed over time
and been integrated into the larger democratic peace project. Russett and Oneal (2001,
37), for example, contend in their seminal work that “Democracy is easier to sustain in a
peaceful environment,” and “external threats become reasons or justifications for suspending
normal civil liberties, elections, and constitutional government.” Their model of a Kantian
peace recognizes the endogenous “feedback loops” from peace to democracy, trade, and
6
international organization, so there is an explicit recognition that peace at least partially
causes democracy even among some of the staunchest democratic peace advocates.
The problem for those who study democratic differences is that any degree of endogeneity
between the political environment and democracy will introduce bias into additive models
of international conflict. Even a weakly-endogenous relationship, such as that suggested by
Russett and Oneal (2001), will bias estimates of the standard error of any variable that is
correlated with both peace and democracy. Since properly specified models will include only
variables directly related to conflict, by definition, and democracy is a common predictor of
the lack of conflict, the degree of bias will turn mostly on the correlation between a variable
of interest and democracy. Given the large amount of effort that has been used to determine
that democracies are different from other states in their relations, this implies far-reaching
concerns for studies examining the ancillary properties of the democratic peace.
A strongly endogenous relationship—or the case where democracy is a result of a peace-
ful environment—may have even more troubling implications for existing studies. Should
democracy be dependent in some fashion on the establishment of peace (see, e.g., arguments
by Thompson (1996) or Gibler (2012)), then democratic differences in a particular variable
may simply underscore a more pervasive sample-selection process that made these cases ob-
servable. Alliances among democracies would, almost by definition, be more likely to be
those formed or continuing after a threat has subsided. In other words, if peace is causally
related to both democracy and cooperation, studies that fail to explicitly model this when
looking at the effect of democracy on cooperation will suffer from a specific form of omit-
ted variable bias: functional form misspecification, where the omitted variables represent
nonlinearities—such as those introduced by selection processes—between the dependent and
independent variables (Heckman 1979; Signorino and Yilmaz 2003).
We contend that this is a problem facing many studies of the axillary effects of democracy,
such as the finding that democracies are more reliable alliance partners. Democracies exist
within more peaceful political environments than other states (Ward and Gleditsch 2002).
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Without a clear, immediate threat, alliances that democratic states participate in are unlikely
to ward off potential enemies, as their are none. This implies that either these alliances are
(1) formed for purposes other than deterrence, or (2) maintained even after the threats it was
designed to counteract have subsided. The former indicates that some alliances are formed
as b-types, while the latter suggests that a-types can transform into b-types.
Addressing alliance formation, there are a number of reasons that states seek b-type
alliances that perform other functions other than power aggregation and deterrence. First,
alliances can be used to resolve other contentions issues. Gibler (1996, 1997), for example,
identifies a number of alliances that, rather than aggregate power, serve instead to resolve
outstanding territorial disputes. Second, major powers often use alliances to consolidate
their influence over minor powers (Morrow 1991; Lake 1996). Finally, alliances may be used
to signal policy-alignment (Lake 2009; Nieman 2016), specifically when bandwagoning with
hegemonic powers (McDonald 2015; Mousseau 2019).
Alliances that continue after threats subside raise an interesting question: why would
states maintain seemingly antiquated alliances? One explanation is that such alliances are re-
purposed, whether formally or informally, to serve new or additional purposes. Rather than
negotiate a new treaty, cooperative agreement, or international organization, it may be easier
to use the existing alliance structure to coordination cooperation elsewhere. While alliances
are not costless—well-functioning alliances, in particular, require information sharing and
even joint military exercises (Morrow 1994; Fearon 1997)—neither is creating new agreements
and organizations. Given that an alliance already exists, states in peaceful environments may
find that this existing institution can fruitfully perform tasks other than deterrence, such as
facilitating coordination on counter-terrorism, border surveillance, or even encourage trade.
In this way, a-type alliances transform into b-types, remaining a valuable foreign policy tool
for each member, even in changing political environments.
That both democracies and b-type alliances are likely in peaceful political environments
has profound implications for evaluating whether regime type affects alliance reliability. For
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instance, due to a lack of external threats, b-type alliances are less likely to be formally
invoked. This, in turn, makes them less likely to be abrogated, more likely to last longer,
and more likely to be institutionalized over time. Since states democratize in these same
peaceful environments, if one ignores the role of the peaceful political environment, they may
erroneously attribute the effect of the political environment to the democratic institutions
of those alliance members. In other words, when we observe democracy correlated with
reliable, durable, and institutionalized alliance partnerships, we are really be observing the
effects of peaceful environments on both democracies and alliance behavior.5
That political environments vary by their threat level implies that there are two distinct
ideal types of alliance within the overall sample of alliances: a sub-sample of alliances that
act as traditional, power-aggregating (a-type) alliances—those within a more threatening
environment—and a second sub-sample that primarily serve other purposes (b-types), such
as non-military cooperation—those in more peaceful environments. Alliances drawn from
the former are significantly more likely to be invoked, and constitute the sample that most
accurately tests whether democracies are more reliable alliance partners, than alliances drawn
from the latter. This argument leads to two hypotheses:
H1 (Political environment): States in peaceful political environments are less likely to
abrogate their alliance commitments.
H2 (Democratic institutions): Once the political environment is accounted for, demo-
cratic states are no more reliable alliance partners than other states.
Research design
We test the effect of a state’s conflict environment and regime type on its propensity to
violate alliance agreements by analyzing all members of bilateral alliances formed during the
period 1919–1989. We use data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions dataset
5In quantitative studies, this means that, unless explicitly modeled, democracies are attributed the
indirect effect of peaceful environments, even if they include a measure for peaceful environment.
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(Leeds et al. 2002; Leeds and Mattes 2007), which consists of 234 bilateral alliances. The
directed alliance member-year is our unit of analysis because it allows us to assess which party
violated the terms of an alliance. The temporal domain of our analysis is 1920–2001. We use
a split-population logit estimator to probabilistically identify and separate alliances that exist
in peaceful political environments—i.e. those that are unlikely to be invoked—from those
alliances in threatening political environments. We adopt an instrumental variable approach
to account for any endogeneity between alliance reliability and militarized conflict.
Methodology
We expect alliances to separate into two stylized types—those that are “at-risk” of being in-
voked and those that are not—based each state’s external threat environment. States in more
threatening environments are at greater risk of having their alliances invoked, which provides
opportunities to violate the alliance’s terms, while states in safer environments have fewer
opportunities to commit violations. If our argument is correct, then full-sample estimates of
the predictors of alliance violation, which ignore these different types of environments, will
recover biased estimates.
Ignoring the conditioning effect of threat environments, and treating all alliance ob-
servations as equally at-risk of entering the set of states that may violate their alliance
commitments—which is true for traditional additive binary-choice estimators, such as logit
or probit—is a type of model misspecification (Heckman 1979; Signorino and Yilmaz 2003).
Unfortunately, we cannot definitively know ex ante with certainty which alliances are un-
likely to be invoked; leaders do not often volunteer whether they considered violating their
alliance obligations. Instead, we only have data on whether an alliance was violated, but
not direct data on the degree that the alliance is “at-risk.”
To address these data limitations, we use a split-population logistic regression model
(Xiang 2010; see also Beger et al. 2011). A split-population logit is a type of mixture model,
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where an outcome variable is a function of two processes.6 The logic of the estimator is
that there are two populations in the data, and entry into each population can be estimated
probabilistically. Though the structure of the alliance data does not let us directly observe
which cases are actually in the “at-risk” pool, it can be estimated. The estimator does this
by using two equations: one equation that functions as the selector, identifying relevant
observations to include in the at-risk sample, and a second equation that estimates the out-
come of interest on these relevant observations. The relevance equation affects the outcome
equation probabilistically: some cases are treated as more “at-risk” than others, and this
probability conditions estimates of the outcome equation.7
More formally, the estimator treats the outcome variable as a function of two processes:
Yi = 0 with probability (1−Ri) + (Ri)(1− Vi) (1)
Yi = 1 with probability RiVi (2)
where R and V are cumulative distribution functions of a binary choice model (see Xiang
2010, 487-488). Ri represents the probability that a case is relevant to the sample—that the
observation should be in the outcome equation, i.e. an “at-risk” state8—and conditions Vi,
which represents the probability of violating an alliance. These probabilities can be specified
6All selection and zero-inflated models are types of mixture models, with the familiar censored probit-
types of selection models (e.g., Heckman 1979; Sartori 2003) including data on the outcome of the first stage,
and more recent extensions modeling selection when there are not data available on the outcome for the
first stage (Xiang 2010; Nieman 2015, 2018; Bagozzi 2016; Bagozzi and Mukherjee 2012). The relationship
between selection and zero-inflated models is such that the probit variant of the split-population model is
mathematically equivalent to Poirier’s (1980) bivariate probit with partial observability (Xiang 2010, 488).
7Partial observability models, of which split-population logit and other zero-inflated model are a type,
have been shown to correctly recover the sign and significance for parameters, even if variables are specified
in the wrong equation, permitting accurate hypothesis testing (Nieman 2015, 438-439), though there are
some criticisms of their overall reliability (Rainey and Jackson 2017). In this particular case, however, the
alternative to estimating a partially observed model is to simply ignore bias induced by the two types of
political environment altogether, which may result in inaccurate hypothesis testing and substantive effects
(Xiang 2010). To address concerns of reliability, we formally assess model fit and conduct robustness checks
in the Appendix in Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4.
8This implies, of course, that the inverse, 1−R, is the probability of an observation selecting out of the
“at-risk” subsample—i.e. being identified as “not at-risk.”
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as:
Pr(Yi = 0) = [1− Λ(Ziγ)] + [(Λ(Ziγ))(1− Λ(Xiβ))] (3)
Pr(Yi = 1) = (Λ(Ziγ))(Λ(Xiβ) (4)
where Z andX are vectors of covariates associated with the relevancy and outcome equations,
respectively, γ and β the accompanying parameter estimates, and Λ is the logistic link
function. Equation 3 can, of course, be simplified as Pr(Yi = 0) = [1 − (Λ(Ziγ))(Λ(Xiβ))].
The likelihood function of the split-population logit is written as:
L =
n∏
i=1
[(Λ(Ziγ))(Λ(Xiβ))]
yi [1− (Λ(Ziγ))(Λ(Xiβ))]
1−yi (5)
and estimates of β and γ are recovered via maximum likelihood estimation.9
In other words, the estimator treats cases where Y = 0 in the data as being the outcome of
either (1) not at-risk, or (2) being at-risk, but not abrogated, whereas Y = 1 is the outcome
of being both at-risk and abrogated. This modeling approach allows us to statistically
separate b-type alliances members in non-threatening environments, which are unlikely to
have their alliance enacted, from a-type alliance member, where threats to member states
increase the possibility of alliance terms being invoked. As an example, suppose an alliance
is formed during a relatively high-threat time period in which the likelihood of conflict in
that dyad-year is 35%. The split-population logit would then assign 35% of the estimation
to the relevance equation since it is part of the at-risk population of alliances. The remaining
percentage of the estimation would be considered not at-risk and would be grouped with the
alliances formed during more peaceful periods. The result of this weighting is analogous, in a
sense, to including an interaction term, since the model corrects for the conditional effect of
the sample-selection process. However, rather than interacting two variables, the interaction
is between the full set of variables from the outcome and relevance equations.
9As the estimator is not included as an ‘off-the-shelf’ option with most statistical software, we include
sample stata code on p. 13 of the Appendix for interested readers.
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Though this process does weigh each observation by its political threat environment, the
test remains quite conservative. The likelihood of threat in any given dyad-year is often much
smaller than the 35% figure used in our example, so for each alliance we are only assigning
a small portion of its effect on the overall model to the relevance equation. Conversely, the
current standard approach within this research tradition is to conflate such cases as peace
settlements or trade pacts that have alliance clauses with the offensive and defensive pacts
formed in the years prior to major wars. As we demonstrate below, this standard assumption
significantly affects whether several key variables predict alliance reliability or failure.
Data
Our dependent variable is alliance violation, which captures whether a state abrogates its
alliance commitments. We follow Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009, 469-470) and code alliance
violation as 1 if state A violated the terms of an alliance. They code an alliance as abrogated
if (1) a major provision is violated and governments do not agree to continue with the alliance
or (2) one government unilaterally ends the alliance prior to its terms. There are 74 instances
of alliance violation among the 234 alliances in the data set, roughly 32% of all alliances.10
Next, we specify the relevancy and outcome equations of the split-population logit (Xiang
2010). Following our theory, we specify the relevance equation with predictors related to
a state’s geopolitical threat environment. We expect that the absence of a threatening
environment is associated with fewer opportunities for a state to violate the terms of its
alliances, as there are fewer reasons to invoke an alliance. Alliances that are formed or
maintained in such environments are likely for peaceful, cooperative purposes, rather than
power-aggregation. Alliances formed and maintained in more threatening environments,
however, are more likely to invoked. Such alliances are also more likely to be broken, as
states called upon to assist an ally may determine that it is no longer rational for them
10After accounting for missing data, there are 70 violations in the exact replication of Leeds, Mattes and
Vogel (2009) reported in Table 1 Model 1, 68 violations in the 1920–2001 samples reported in Models 2 and 3,
and 34 observations in the post-1949 samples reported in Models 4 and 5. See Table A.6 in the Appendix
for the complete list of abrogated alliances.
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to honor their agreed terms. We specify the outcome equation, with predictors that have
previously been identified with affecting alliance commitment, namely the probability of a
violation. We build on Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009) and include variables such as joint
democracy and whether a state has had a change in their leader’s societal coalitions, as well
as dyadic- and alliance-specific features.
Relevance equation
Our primary measure of a state’s threat environment is territorial threat. We conceptual-
ize territorial threat as the maximum level of cross-border threat that a state faces. We
operationalize this as the maximum predicted probability of a fatal militarized interstate
dispute for state A for all contiguous neighbors. This value provides a continuous, latent
measure of territorial threat. We construct a time-varying measure of territorial threat for
each observation in the data set.
The predicted probability of a fatal militarized interstate dispute is estimated using
data from Gibler and Tir (2014, Table 1). Gibler and Tir emphasize territorial predictors
of conflict among contiguous neighbors, such as previous peaceful and violent transfers of
territory within a dyad, the highest level of militarization of a state’s neighbors, previous
territorial MIDs within a dyad, and the age of the dyad’s border. They include controls for
whether there is a shared colonizer, the presence of a civil war for either state within a dyad,
or defense pacts with neighbors. The results for the logit model used to construct territorial
threat are presented in Table A.1 of the Appendix.
We use this measure for two reasons: first, it best captures the theoretical concept of a
dangerous neighborhood. While we include other possible sources of a dangerous political
environment, we expect territorial threat to be the best identifier of “at-risk” alliance ob-
servations. There is strong evidence that territorial disputes are the single best predictor
of militarized conflict (Bremer 1992; Vasquez 1995, 2009; Reed and Chiba 2010). Yet, it is
the threat of conflict—rather than just its realization—that is likely to spur participation in
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a-type alliances. Neighbors with territorial disputes are likely to appear as more stressful
and immediate threats than other potential sources, as neighboring states are usually able to
quickly project power to their borders. Thus, we expect territorial threats to be the mostly
likely source of the power aggregating alliances described by traditional alliance theory.
Second, using an instrumental variable—i.e. the predicted probability of conflict—rather
than looking at observed militarized conflict is advantageous in methodologically, as it helps
avoid issues related to endogeneity between alliance reliability and militarized conflict.11 We
account for uncertainty in our estimate of the instrumental variable by taking 10 draws from
the estimated distribution of the maximum predicted territorial threat, and using these to
calculate point estimates and standard errors, following Rubin’s (1987) formula for multiple
imputation (see Boehmke, Chyzh and Thies 2016, for a similar re-sampling approach).12
As initial evidence of a relationship, we find that 57 of the 74 alliance violations (≈ 77%)
have a territorial threat above the median territorial threat for all allied states. Figure 1
displays the kernel density of territorial threat for the observations within the sample. It
also reports the frequency of alliance violations at differing threat levels. The figure shows
that at low threat levels, alliances are violated less than expected by chance, while at high
threat levels there are more violations than would be expected.
We also control other factors that may also influence the hostility of a state’s political
environment. We include the number of borders and proportion of democratic borders. States
with more boarders have more opportunities for conflict (Vasquez 1995, 2009), though this is
mitigated as a greater proportion of a state’s neighborhood is democratic (Kadera, Crescenzi
11Whether an alliance is violated is unlikely to be related to the exogenous variables used to construct
the instrument: the correlation between alliance violation and each exogenous variable to construct the
instrument is r < |0.1|. Moreover, our instrument appears to be strong; the difference in the F-statistic
between nested logits is 19.12, well above the threshold of 10 used to indicate that it does not suffer from
weak instrument bias (Stock and Watson 2011). For the F-test, we estimate a logit with alliance violation
treated as a function of the independent variables from the relevance equation.
12The point estimate for each parameter is the mean of the 10 draws, or 1
10
∑
10
k βk, while the standard
error is the average of the estimated variances within the datasets plus the variance in the point estimates
across datasets, or
√
1
10
∑
10
k s
2
k + (1 +
1
10
)σ2β , where s
2
k is the standard error for dataset k and σ
2
k is the
variance in β between datasets. See Rubin (1987). As few as 5 draws from the estimated distribution is
sufficient to incorporate uncertainty (Mislevy 1991).
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Figure 1: Density of Territorial Threat and Frequency of Violations.
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Note: The frequency of violations is overlayed with the kernel density of Territorial Threat within the
sample from Table 1 Model 3.
and Shannon 2003). These variables are based on Stinnett et al. (2002) and Marshall and
Jaggers (2014). We control for rivalry, as this indicates already heightened tensions (Diehl
and Goertz 2000; Rasler and Thompson 2006), and whether a state is a major power, as these
are more generally more active and attractive alliance partners (Chiba, Martinez Machain
and Reed 2014). Data on rivalries and major powers are obtained from Klein, Goertz and
Diehl (2006) and the Correlates of War Project (2016). We include an indicator variable
for the Cold War to account for systemic effects owing to a bipolar system (Bennett and
Stam 2004). Economically developed states, often clustered geographically, may have com-
plex economies that create norms that constrain conflictual behavior (Mousseau 2003). We
operationalize economic development as the log of energy consumption per capita (Singer,
Bremer and Stuckey 1972).13 Finally, we control for whether a state is an oil producer, as
such states are more conflict prone (Colgan 2013).
13Economic consumption per capita is available for a broader time frame than GDP/capita and is are
correlated at r = 0.7.
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Outcome equation
We rely on Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009, Table 1, Model 1) to specify our outcome equation.
Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009) find that changes in a leader’s core constituency and (the
absence of) democratic institutions are highly correlated with alliance violations. Their
conclusion affirms previous studies that find democratic governments to be seemingly more
reliable alliance partners. Change in leader’s societal coalition is measured as a binary
variable that is 1 if there is a change in the core domestic supporting coalition of state A in
a year. Democracy is coded 1 if state A has a score ≥ 6 on the −10 to 10 Polity IV index
(Marshall and Jaggers 2014).
Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009) include several dyadic measures expected to decrease the
reliability of international commitments. Change in international power is a binary variable
measured 1 if there is a change of >20% in either state since the alliance was formed. Change
in political institutions is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if either state experiences a
change in political institutions since the alliance was formed. Change in external threat is a
binary variable coded as 1 if the level of external threat between the current year and the
start year of the alliance changed by 30%.14 Formation of new outside alliance is a binary
measure coded as 1 if state A formed a new alliance.
Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009) also include four alliance-specific variables in their anal-
ysis. Each of these are expected to reduce the risk that an alliance is abrogated. Asymmetry
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if an alliance includes a major and minor power. Non-
military cooperation is a binary variable coded as 1 if an alliance has provisions linking
nonmilitary issues to the alliance. Ratification is a dichotomous variable measured as 1
if an alliance was formally ratified. Military cooperation is a binary variable coded as 1
14This measure differs substantially from our measure of territorial threat in terms of both composition
and by focusing on whether there is a change in environment. The measure used by Leeds, Mattes and
Vogel is based on a variable from Leeds and Savun (2007, 1127), which represents the sum of the capabilities
(Correlates of War CINC scores) for politically relevant states (neighbors and major powers) that do not
share an alliance and have a foreign policy affinity score (S score, a similarity score based on alliance portfolio)
below the median value in their sample (median = .775). Our measure of territorial threat, however, is a
latent measure focused on territorial determinants of conflict by contiguous neighbors.
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if an alliance includes provisions related to peacetime military cooperation. Lastly, cubic
polynomials are included to account for temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010).
Empirical analysis
Table 1 presents the results comparing logit and split-population logit models. We estimate
five models: the first two are estimated with a traditional logit and the third is the full model
estimated with a split-population logit. Model 1 provides an exact replication of Leeds,
Mattes and Vogel (2009) for estimating alliance violations. Model 2 re-estimates Leeds,
Mattes and Vogel, but restricts the sample to only those observations that are common
to both the original and full model. This ensures that parameter estimates in the outcome
question are comparable once we account for the relevance equation, as both samples contain
the exact same cases. Model 3 reports the estimates of the full model using the split-
population logit, which includes both relevance and violation equations. Finally, Models 4
and 5 reports estimates of the 1950–2001 period for when relevance is ignored and accounted
for, respectively.15 The top of the table reports the outcome (violation) equation, and the
bottom of the table reports the relevance (the degree an observation is “at-risk”) equation.
The results are interpreted in a relatively straightforward way: positive coefficients in-
dicate that increases in a variable make the outcome for that equation more likely. Hence,
positive coefficients for variables in the relevance equation indicate an increase in the proba-
bility of being in the “at-risk” sub-sample of violating an alliance, while negative coefficients
indicate a decreased likelihood of being in the “at-risk” sub-sample.16 Similarly, positive co-
efficients for variables in the outcome equation indicate an increased likelihood of an alliance
violation.
15We look at a sub-sample since alliance compliance rates decline dramatically pre- and post-WWII
(Berkemeier and Fuhrmann 2018).
16We focus on “opting into,” rather than “opting out of,” the at-risk sample. Our focus on observations
being treated as “at-risk” or “opting in” to the outcome equation, of course, is the mathematical inverse of
identifying the “zero-inflated” observations that “opt out.” Reporting our results this way is consistent with
previous studies using this estimation technique (e.g., Xiang 2010, 2017; Bagozzi 2016; Nieman 2015, 2018).
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Table 1: Political Environment, Democracy, and Alliance Violations.
LMV Original LMV Reduced Full LMV Reduced Full
Time 1920-2001 1920-2001 1920-2001 1950-2001 1950-2001
Outcome Equation
Change in Leader’s Societal Coalition 0.889* 0.910* 5.477 1.772* 11.247
(0.436) (0.444) (5.055) (0.528) (9.586)
Democracy -1.322* -1.341* 1.336 -1.813* 0.856
(0.393) (0.401) (1.841) (0.556) (2.517)
Change in International Power 0.803* 0.877* 3.018 0.727 2.222*
(0.330) (0.340) (2.247) (0.464) (0.928)
Change in Political Institutions 0.131 0.195 1.703 0.010 2.651
(0.308) (0.308) (1.294) (0.465) (2.365)
Change in External Threat 0.421 0.425 0.765 -0.069 -0.673
(0.270) (0.278) (1.261) (0.445) (1.859)
Formation of New Outside Alliance 1.070* 1.064* 2.452 1.145* 2.985*
(0.253) (0.261) (1.628) (0.380) (1.298)
Asymmetry -0.408 -0.503 -1.625 -0.510 -1.696
(0.259) (0.265) (0.909) (0.424) (1.329)
Non-military Cooperation -0.746* -0.746* -2.684* 0.055 -2.784
(0.257) (0.261) (1.190) (0.498) (3.363)
Ratification -0.083 -0.134 1.513 -0.265 1.172
(0.354) (0.355) (2.299) (0.466) (4.741)
Military Cooperation 0.557* 0.575* 4.978* 1.043* 5.794*
(0.180) (0.186) (2.224) (0.280) (2.552)
Time -0.086 -0.069 -0.124 -0.000 -0.065
(0.077) (0.076) (0.276) (0.114) (0.526)
Time Squared 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.022)
Time Cubed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -4.448* -4.464* -3.210* -5.660* -3.412
(0.440) (0.455) (1.447) (0.901) (3.267)
Relevance (At-risk) Equation
Territorial Threat 4.198* 6.412*
(1.126) (2.620)
Proportion of Democratic Borders -0.299* -0.072
(0.121) (0.246)
Number of Borders 0.119 0.012
(0.062) (0.125)
Major Power 0.446 -0.291
(0.511) (1.087)
Rivalry -0.009 -0.140
(0.399) (0.477)
Cold War 0.424 2.195*
(0.309) (1.043)
Economic Development -0.150 -0.163
(0.083) (0.137)
Oil Producer 0.675 1.333*
(0.513) (0.540)
Constant -4.564* -5.178*
(0.403) (1.406)
Log-likelihood -352.394 -339.988 -307.564 -177.293 -156.730
Observations (Alliances) 6612 (223) 6395 (223) 6395 (223) 4952 (139) 4952 (139)
Note: *p <0.05, two-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses. Point estimates and standard errors in models 3 and 5
were calculated from 10 draws using Rubin’s (1987) formula for multiple imputation to account for uncertainty in the
territorial threat instrumental variable.
Again, the first model is an exact replication of the original Leeds, Mattes and Vogel
(2009, Table 1, Model 1) study, and the results are consistent with their earlier findings: all
coefficients and standard errors remain the same as in the original study. Model 2 restricts
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the Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009) sample of cases to only those observations included in
both the exact replication and the full split-population model. All of the parameter estimates
are approximately the same, and all relationships are in the same direction and have the
same level of significance as the original analysis. Model 2 thus provides a baseline from
which to compare our full split-population model.
Model 3 estimates a split-population model where territorial threat and other factors
related to the political environment are treated as part of the relevance equation, which
identifies observations that select into the pool of cases at-risk of violating their alliances
in the violation equation. As expected, the coefficient on territorial threat is positive and
statistically significant in the relevance equation. This result indicates that states are more
likely to enter the at-risk population for alliance abrogation when external territorial threats
are high and is consistent with H1.
Turning to the violation equation, we see that, after accounting for the underlying sample-
selection process, the sign on democracy is now positive, though statistically insignificant.
This result is suggestive that the previous finding of a negative and significant effect associ-
ated with democracy in Models 1 and 2 may, in fact, have indicated that democracies were
less likely to violate their alliances not because they are more reliable, but because they exist
in peaceful neighborhoods and were less likely to have military provisions invoked. Thus,
the endogeneity between peace and democracy seems to explain why democracies behave
differently when engaging in alliance politics. Similarly, changes in leader’s societal coalition
also fails to reach any traditional level of statistical significance.
To more formally assess whether democracy exerts a null effect once the political environ-
ment is accounted for, we use a technique introduced to political science by Rainey (2014).
The idea is to identify the smallest ‘meaningful effect’, and then determine whether the es-
timated quantity of interest meets this threshold. If the estimate (and its 90% confidence
interval) fails to meet the threshold identified as the smallest ‘meaningful effect’, then the
effect is marginal; i.e. there is statistical evidence that the variable has little or no effect
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on the outcome of interest. If the estimate (and its 90% confidence interval) is equal to or
surpasses the threshold, then the effect is appears to be non-marginal.
Given that estimated parameters in logit-based models are difficult to interpret directly,
we follow Rainey’s advice and focus on assessing whether the independent variable affects the
predicted probability of the outcome of interest. In our case, we evaluate whether democracy
exerts a meaningful effect by seeing if it reduces the likelihood of alliance violations by at
least one-half of one percent (0.5%); i.e. the effect size should be less than -0.005. To do
this, we take the first difference of the parameter of interest, holding all other parameters at
the their mean or modal values. The 90% confidence interval democracy [-0.001, 0.007] is
greater than -0.005, failing to meet the threshold, indicating that the effect of democracy on
reducing alliances violations is negligible. This result is consistent with H2 and indicates that
the influence of political institutions may actually be attributable to political environment
rather than the institutions themselves.
Applying the same test to changes in leader’s societal coalition, we find different results.
We expect a meaningful effect to increase the likelihood of alliance violations by at least
one-half of one percent when there is a change in a leader’s societal coalition. In this case,
the 90% confidence interval [-0.001, 0.020] includes 0.005, indicating that, though it is not
statistically significant, we cannot rule out a meaningful effect for changes in leader’s societal
coalition.
We re-estimate the reduced and split-population models for the period 1950–2001 in
Models 4 and 5. Once again, territorial threat is positive and statistically significant, and
democracy is no longer statistically significant once the sample-selection process of identifying
“at-risk” observations are modeled jointly with the likelihood of abrogation. Applying the
more formal test of the smallest ‘meaningful effect’, we again expect a 0.5% reduction in
alliance violations as the threshold. We again find that the 90% confidence interval for
democracy [-0.001, 0.004] is larger, rather than smaller, than the smallest meaningful effect
size. Each of these results is supportive of H1 and H2. Taken together with the previous
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results, there is evidence that the negative and statistically significant results associated
with democracy in Models 2 and 4 are spurious, and their effect is instead attributable to
the political environment in which democracies form and exist. Lastly, and in contrast to
estimates for time period 1920–2001 reported in Model 3, change in leader’s societal coalition
is statistically significant at the p < 0.10-level in the period after 1950, even after accounting
for the sample-selection processes of identifying the “at-risk” observations. This difference
suggests that the effect of changes in a leader’s societal coalition are stronger in the 1950–2001
period than before.
We formally compare and evaluate the model fits for the reduced and split-population
models, for each temporal sample, using the Vuong and Clarke distribution-free tests, in
Table A.2 in the Appendix. These tests indicate a strong preference for the split-population
models over the reduced model. We also assess the reliability and robustness of the estimates
from the split-population logit in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix. The stability of the
estimates in the partially observed (relevancy) equation indicate the split-population logit is
appropriate. Finally, we assess whether the initial threat environment in which an alliance is
formed, rather than the current threat environment, determines the risk of future abrogation
in Table A.5 of the Appendix. We find that our time-varying measure of the current threat
level is robust to this specification as well.
Overall, the results are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Threatening envi-
ronments affect the underlying propensity of states to enter the sample at-risk of violating
their alliance terms. Moreover, once the political environment is accounted for, democratic
institutions do not appear to exert a significant impact on whether an alliance violation
occurs. States in non-threatening environments appear less likely to be involved in the tradi-
tional capability-aggregating, a-type alliance associated with international conflict. Rather,
alliances that continue after their members’ external threats have subsided are often re-
purposed as b-types, used to deepening economic ties (Gowa and Mansfield 2004; Li and
Vashchilko 2010) or to demonstrate political affinity (McManus and Nieman 2019). As
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states are more likely to democratize in peaceful environments, b-type alliances are more
likely to consist of democracies.
Substantive effects
To illustrate the substantive effect of territorial threat and political institutions on alliance
abrogation, we report predicted probabilities of alliance violations in Figures 2 and 3. In
the first figure, we report predicted probabilities for two conditions: for democracies [red
line] and for non-democracies [black line], after accounting for the level of territorial threat
affecting the state [solid lines]. As a point of reference, we also compare these predicted
probabilities to those from the reduced model [dashed lines], which does not account for
the effect of territorial threat on an observation’s probability of being part of the at-risk
subsample. In the second figure, we repeat this procedure, reporting a change in the leader’s
winning coalition [red line] and when there is no change in the leader’s winning coalition
[black line], after accounting for territorial threat [solid lines]. The reduced model is again
provided as a reference [dashed lines]. To make the substantive results more realistic, and to
ensure that outliers are not skewing our interpretation, we visualize predicted probabilities
of alliance abrogation for the middle 95% of values of territorial threat from the estimated
sample. Finally, we report predicted probabilities for both the full time period and the
1950–2001 period.
Figure 2 shows that, while democracy is associated with a lower likelihood of alliance
violation in the reduced model [red dashed line is below the black dashed line], in the
full model democracies are associated with an increased probability of an alliance violation
[red solid line above black solid line]. Moreover, increases in territorial threat raise the
probability of an alliance violation regardless of whether regimes are democratic [both solid
lines increase], suggesting that the threat environment is driving the change. Comparing
the sub-figure for the whole sample to that for the 1950–2001 sample, it is clear that the
effects for territorial threat are similar, though the difference in regime types is weaker in
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Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of an Alliance Violation, Democracy, and Territorial
Threat.
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Note: Estimates for the full time period from Table 1, Models 2 and 3. Estimates for the post−1945 period
from Table 1, Models 4 and 5. All variables held at mean or median. Figure reports the predicted
probabilities for the middle 95% of values of Territorial Threat from the samples.
Democratic Regime (w/ Relevance)
Non−Democratic Regime (w/ Relevance)
Democratic Regime (Reduced)
Non−Democratic Regime (Reduced)
the 1950–2001 period. It is worth keeping in mind, of course, that the difference between
democracies and non-democracies were shown to be negligible (or in the wrong direction),
according to the test suggested by Rainey (2014).
Figure 3 looks at the impact of a change in the a leader’s societal coalition. The figure
demonstrates that a change is associated with increases in the probability of an alliance
violation [red lines are above corresponding black lines] and also that a change in the winning
coalition increases the likelihood of a violation as the degree of territorial threat rises [solid red
line]. Territorial threat also increase the probability of an alliance violation when there is no
change in a leader’s winning coalition [solid black line], though this effect is much smaller.17
The figure shows that threat environment significantly influences the effect of changes in the
17The predicted probability of an alliance violation in a democratic state, which experiences a change in
their leader’s winning coalition, is almost identical to the probability of a violation when there is a change
in the leader’s winning coalition in a non-democracy, at every territorial threat level. This suggests that the
interaction of the two variables exerts little substantive impact, once territorial threat is accounted for.
24
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of an Alliance Violation, Change in Leader’s Winning
Coalition, and Territorial Threat.
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Note: Estimates for the full time period from Table 1, Models 2 and 3. Estimates for the post−1945 period
from Table 1, Models 4 and 5. All variables held at mean or median. Figure reports the predicted
probabilities for the middle 95% of values of Territorial Threat from the samples.
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leader’s winning coalition on the probability of an alliance violation. Moreover, comparing
the sub-figure for the full sample to that for the 1950–2001 sample, it is clear that this effect
is stronger in the 1950–2001 period.
Notably, the territorial threat matters at all points along the spectrum for Figures 2 and
3: in low threat environments, the presence of a democracy exerts only a small risk of an
alliance violation. Similarly, in the absence of an external threat, a change in a leader’s
winning coalition has very little effect on alliance abrogation. Instead, it appears abrogation
becomes much more likely for democracies as the level of territorial threat increases. The
same holds for a change in the leader’s winning coalition: alliance abrogation is more likely
as territorial threat increases. For the latter, these effects appear to be even stronger in the
1950–2001 period. A clear implication from examining the substantive effects is that ignoring
threat environment significantly overestimates the effect of both democracy and changes in
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a leader’s winning coalition at low levels of threat and significantly underestimates these
effects at high levels of threat. That is, accounting for territorial threat, and the political
environment more broadly, improves our understanding of the roles of political institutions
and leadership changes in substantively meaningful ways.
Conclusion
We began this paper by pointing out that endogeneity between peace and democracy will
bias additive-model estimates of many other democracy-related arguments, and we have
shown that to be the case with regard to international alliances. Democracies in alliances
have been thought to be more reliable, but we demonstrate that this result is likely to be
spurious. Democracy is more likely to take hold in peaceful international environments, and
peaceful environments seldom provoke the type of alliance making associated with aggregat-
ing capabilities to defend the state. In other words, democratic alliances are different from
other types of alliances, but this has little to do with regime type.
Also noteworthy is our finding that, under some conditions, traditional alliance theories
may be correct. Quantitative analyses of alliances and conflict generally pool the sample of
all cases to assess conflict-proneness and reliability. Our findings suggest, however, that their
are two qualitatively distinct types of alliances: power-aggregating alliances formed in hostile
environments and alliances serving other functions formed in more peaceful environments.
The former type of alliance is a reaction to threats to the state and is manifestly different in
their behavior. These alliances are shorter statements of intentions attempting to ward off
potential aggressors, and the commitments expressed in these treaties are much more likely
to be abrogated. Alliances that correlate with conflict may not be more than the scraps of
paper traditional theories expect. Accounting for the threat environment, therefore, may
help to explain why alliances are correlated with peace in some periods, and with conflict,
or even the diffusion of conflict, in others (e.g., Levy 1981; Kadera 1998; Senese and Vasquez
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2008).
Finally, our argument and results have implications beyond the alliance literature, raising
concerns about a number of second-order findings associated with the democratic peace
research program more broadly. Current scholarship suggests that democratic states trade
more often with other democracies, and democracies may also be more active in international
governance. Each of these literatures, however, tend to pool samples without regard to
threat environment, potentially biasing results by attributing sole explanatory power to
an outcome—political institutions—rather an (at least partial) underlying causal process—
peaceful political environments. This criticism, moreover, extends to almost all studies that
find some type of democratic difference in state behavior. Ultimately, democratic institutions
may still affect state behavior once peaceful environments take hold, but we just do not yet
know. Our paper presents an important set of questions for these long-accepted relationships:
without control for the effect of dangerous environments, current estimates of the effect of
democracy on behavior are biased and may be spurious.
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Online Appendix
This appendix includes additional information to that in the main manuscript. First, we
present the estimates of the model used to construct the instrumental variable. Second,
we compare the model fits of the logit and split-sample logit for both temporal samples
using the Vuong and Clarke test criteria. Next, we conduct a series of robustness checks,
including reduced models and alternative specifications, as well as an alternative theoretical
account where the initial threat level conditions whether cases are probabilistically treated
as “at-risk.” The models presented in the main text outperform, and are robust to, each
of these alternative specifications. Finally, we present Stata code for the split-sample logit,
and report a table of all alliance violations.
1
1 Construction of the Instrumental Variable, Territo-
rial Threat
Table A.1 reports the estimates of the variables used to construct the primary independent
variable, territorial threat. Data and model specification are from Gibler and Tir (2014,
Table 1). Our model differs from Gibler and Tir (2014), however, in that while they use
the period from 1816–1999, we use the period 1900–2001. We make this change because
the factors that affect conflict in the nineteenth century may not be the same as those in
the twentieth (Bennett and Stam 2004). All results are consistent with Gibler and Tir’s
(2014) findings, with the exception of civil war in either state, which is significant at the
p <0.1-level in our replication, compared to the p <0.05-level in the original analysis.
Table A.1: Predicting Fatal MIDs in Contiguous Dyads, 1900–2001.
β S.E.
Same Colonial Master 0.235* (0.113)
Peaceful Territorial Transfer in Dyad -0.568* (0.184)
Violent Territorial Transfer in Dyad 0.514* (0.116)
Defense Pact with All Neighbors -0.908* (0.213)
Civil War in Either State 0.169 (0.102)
Highest Militarization Level Among Neighbors 14.023* (1.619)
Previous Territorial MID Against Either State 0.424* (0.091)
Border Age (logged) 0.181* (0.036)
Peace Years -0.434* (0.024)
Peace Years (Squared) 0.012* (0.001)
Peace Years (Cubed) -0.000* (0.000)
Constant -2.753* (0.134)
Log-likelihood -1877.638
Observations 15058
Note: *p <0.05, two-tailed. Replication of Gibler and Tir (2014,
Table 1) for 1900–2001.
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2 Model Fit Comparisons
We demonstrate that inclusion of the relevance equation improves our model fit and the
quality of our estimates. To do this, we compare the model fit of models 2 and 3 from
Table 1, using Vuong’s (1989) and Clarke’s (2003, 2007) tests for non-nested models. We use
the Vuong and Clarke tests, rather than an F -test or likelihood ratio test because models 2
and 3 are non-nested due to their differing functional forms: model 2 assumes an additive non-
linear logit function while model 3 is a mixture of two logistic distributions (for a discussion
on differing types of non-nested models, see Clarke 2001).1 We also compare models 4
and 5 from Table 1, which provided analogous estimates during the 1950–2001 period, as a
robustness check.
The Vuong test compares the mean log-likelihood ratios of two models. If the first
model is closer to the true specification, then the mean log-likelihood ratio is positive and
statistically significant. As is common practice, we apply the Schwarz’s correction to the
Vuong test. The correction penalizes for the inclusion of additional parameters in a model.
That is, the models that include the relevance equation are penalized because they estimate
more parameters than the reduced model. More formally, the corrected Vuong test is:
LRn
(
θ˜n, γ˜n
)
−
[(p
2
)
lnn−
(q
2
)
lnn
]
(1)
where LR is the log-likelihood ratio, θ˜ and γ˜ are the model estimates, and p and q are
the number of estimated parameters for model f and g, which are the two models being
compared (Vuong 1989).
Clarke’s distribution-free test, meanwhile, tests whether the median logged ratio of the
likelihood for the individual observations of two models are equal. If the first model is closer
to the true specification, more than half of the individual logged ratios of the likelihoods will
1Neither AIC nor BIC are appropriate as they do not include information from the rival theory, nor do
they permit probabilistic statements regarding model selection (Clarke 2003).
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be greater than zero. More formally:
H0 : Pr0
[
ln
f (Yi|Xi; β∗)
g (Yi|Zi; γ∗)
> 0
]
= 0.5 (2)
where the numerator is estimated model f , which predicts Yi from a set of covariates, Xi,
and estimated parameters, β
∗
; the denominator is estimated model g, which predicts Yi from
a set of covariates, Zi, and estimated parameters, γ∗. The null hypothesis is that the median
logged ratio of the likelihoods between the two models is equal to 0, i.e. the probability that
the median logged ratio of the likelihoods of f is greater than g is 0.5. If di is set equal to
lnf (Yi|Xi; β∗)− lng (Yi|Zi; γ∗), the test statistic is:
B =
n∑
i=1
I(0,+∞) (di) (3)
where I is a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if ni > 0 in Equation 2, and 0 if ni ≤ 0.
Equation 3 is the sum of positive differences and is distributed according to a Binomial
distribution with n trials and a mean equal to 0.5. We apply the average Schwarz correction
to Clarke’s distribution-free test, adjusting the individual log-likelihoods for model f by a
factor [(p/2n)lnn] and those of model g by a factor [(q/2n)lnn] (see Clarke 2007, 350).
Table A.2 reports the results of our non-nested model comparisons. The test statistic for
the Vuong test is 40.02 for the full model (Table 1, Model 3) compared to the reduced model
(Table 1 Model 2). This returns a p-value of <0.001, allowing us to reject the null that the
models are equivalent.
Using Clarke’s test, we find that the split-population model returns a positive log-
likelihood ratio for 4468 of the 6395 observations, which generates a p-value of <0.001. We
are thus able to reject the null that the models are equal and again find empirical support
for the full models.
We find similar support looking in the 1950–2001 sample. The full split-population model
(Table 1, Model 5) again outperforms the the reduced model (Table 1, Model 4).
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Table A.2: Comparison of Model Fit.
Full post-1945
Vuong Test
Vuong 71.86 58.85
SE 1.80 3.23
t-statistic 40.02 18.23
p-value < .001 < .001
Clarke Test∑
n
i
(llMFull,i − llMLMV,i > 0) 4468 3559∑
n
i
(llMFull,i − llMLMV,i < 0) 1927 1393
Positive, one-side test (p-value) < .001 < .001
Note: Clarke distribution-free test uses binomial dis-
tribution (p = .5).
In sum, the results indicate that the two split-population models outperform the models
which assume all states are initially equally “at-risk” of violating an alliance.
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3 Robustness Checks
The following reports several robustness checks, divided into two parts. First, we report sev-
eral reduced models and models with alternative specifications of some variables, to demon-
strate that our variable choice and specification do not drive our main results. Second, we
estimate a model based on an alternative theoretical account of our argument, where the
initial threat level conditions whether cases are probabilistically treated as “at-risk.” The
results of these various specifications are consistent with those from our main model.
Reduced Models
We begin our robustness checks by visualizing the difference in territorial threat between
states that violate an alliance and the full sample (from Table 1). The mean territorial
threat for alliance violators is 0.215 with a standard deviation of 0.193 and N = 74, while
the mean for non-violators is 0.108 with a standard deviation of 0.127 and N = 6768. A
difference of means between the two samples is statistically significant with p < 0.001. As
Figure A.1 demonstrates, a large swath of states at low levels of territorial threat comprise
a large proportion of the non-violators.
Next, we report several additional models in Tables A.3 and A.4. These are various
reduced models that examine the sensitivity of the original model when controlling for the
level of external threat. We also run a model that uses GDP per capita in place of energy
consumption per capita in the 1950–2001 period.2 Note in the relevance equation that Terri-
torial threat is stable across all models and is consistently able to differentiate among alliance
types—i.e. territorial threat is more likely to lead to alliance violations.
The outcome equation, which is the original model conditioned by relevance, demon-
strates that the two primary variables of interest—change in leader coalition and democracy—
are not consistent predictors of alliance violation. Democracy is only statistically significant
in one of the models, and it has a positive coefficient, meaning that democracies are more
2GDP per capita data are only available from 1950 onward.
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Figure A.1: Comparison of Kernel Density of Alliance Violators and Sample Average.
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Note: The mean territorial threat for alliance violators is 0.215 with a standard deviation of 0.193,
while the mean for non−violators sample is 0.108 with a standard deviation of 0.127. A difference of
means between the two samples statistically significant at p < 0.001.
likely to violate their alliances. These results, of course, strongly contradict the argument
that democracies are less likely to abrogate their treaties. The generally negligible effects
(with the only significant result running in the wrong direction) only emphasizes the con-
clusion that democracy is not an accurate predictor of alliance violators once the territorial
threat environment is considered.
We report results in the manuscript that support the idea that leader change matters for
alliance violation, at least among states in the 1950–2001 sample, but our additional models
suggest this result may be dependent upon model specification. Once we consider the threat
environment affecting the alliance member, the effect of leader change disappears. The
original model suggests leader change is statistically insignificant, with an effect size that is
quite large, but our re-analyses imply statistical significance at the traditional p < 0.05-level
in less than half of the conditioned models in Tables A.3 and A.4.
7
Table A.3: Political Environment, Democracy, and Alliance Violations, Robustness
Checks.
Model Democratic Full Change in Alliance
Simple Development Development Alliance Terms
Outcome Equation
Change in Leader’s Societal Coalition 1.149* 12.506* 13.555* 12.482 15.839*
(0.475) (6.005) (2.552) (23.077) (7.443)
Democracy -0.508 0.566 0.568 1.491 2.311*
(0.458) (0.830) (0.854) (1.226) (1.133)
Change in International Power 1.980*
(0.725)
Change in Political Institutions 0.252
(0.637)
Change in External Threat 0.903
(0.847)
Formation of New Outside Alliance 1.578*
(0.693)
Asymmetry -2.204*
(0.735)
Non-military Cooperation -2.204*
(0.735)
Ratification 2.676
(1.456)
Military Cooperation 18.621*
(2.152)
Time 0.028 0.051 0.114 -0.119 0.108
(0.073) (0.109) (0.116) (0.140) (0.154)
Time Squared -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 0.001 -0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Time Cubed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.700 -0.392 -0.703 -2.078* -1.224
(0.981) (0.752) (0.699) (0.672) (1.209)
Relevance Equation
Territorial Threat 4.686* 4.312* 3.849* 3.664* 4.509*
(0.791) (1.025) (1.045) (1.014) (0.969)
Number of Borders 0.083 0.046 0.067 0.124*
(0.066) (0.069) (0.067) (0.056)
Proportion of Democratic Borders -0.347* -0.303 -0.334* -0.281*
(0.153) (0.157) (0.148) (0.112)
Major Power 0.574 0.345 0.756*
(0.381) (0.387) (0.374)
Rivalry 0.248 0.171 0.110
(0.372) (0.386) (0.385)
Cold War -0.048 0.178 0.466
(0.263) (0.275) (0.287)
Economic Development -0.230* -0.216* -0.189*
(0.078) (0.075) (0.075)
Oil Producer 0.374 0.422 0.887*
(0.362) (0.376) (0.372)
Constant -3.097* -4.345* -4.509* -4.447* -5.454*
(0.925) (0.385) (0.464) (0.522) (0.444)
Log-likelihood -385.975 -377.079 -364.525 -350.253 -321.929
Observations (Alliances) 6842 (234) 6811 (234) 6618 (234) 6543 (231) 6470 (226)
Note: *p <0.05, two-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses. Point estimates and standard errors were calculated
from 10 draws using Rubin’s (1987) formula for multiple imputation to account for uncertainty in the territorial
threat instrumental variable.
8
Table A.4: Political Environment, Democracy, and Alliance Violations, Ad-
ditional Robustness Checks.
Model Democratic Democracy Exclude Alt. Econ Dev.
Development Directly Democracy Measure
Outcome Equation
Change in Leader’s Societal Coalition 4.443 7.290 5.173 7.535
(2.821) (6.123) (2.774) (6.987)
Democracy 0.756 2.497 0.542 0.808
(1.607) (2.047) (1.073) (2.044)
Change in International Power 3.794 2.740* 3.256* 2.281*
(5.669) (1.146) (1.570) (0.835)
Change in Political Institutions 1.861 1.609 1.598 2.478
(2.434) (1.002) (1.236) (2.058)
Change in External Threat 1.073 0.896 0.607 -0.637
(2.608) (1.087) (1.128) (1.488)
Formation of New Outside Alliance 3.069 2.330* 2.491* 2.997*
(4.513) (0.833) (1.174) (1.311)
Asymmetry -1.287 -1.376 -1.866* -1.617*
(1.034) (0.803) (0.937) (0.756)
Non-military Cooperation -2.790* -2.798* -3.372* -2.347
(1.112) (1.239) (1.085) (2.940)
Ratification 0.851 2.358 1.662 0.063
(3.319) (1.682) (1.944) (2.517)
Military Cooperation 5.010 3.479* 4.853* 6.792*
(3.556) (1.104) (1.524) (2.462)
Time -0.174 -0.197 -0.105 -0.085
(0.435) (0.253) (0.267) (0.390)
Time Squared -0.002 0.001 -0.005 -0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Time Cubed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -3.199 -3.722* -2.616 -3.082
(1.938) (1.869) (1.371) (1.979)
Relevance Equation
Territorial Threat 3.946* 4.292* 4.973* 6.045*
(1.091) (0.986) (1.057) (2.057)
Number of Borders 0.145 0.044 -0.005
(0.100) (0.050) (0.137)
Proportion of Democratic Borders -0.329* 0.010
(0.121) (0.252)
Democracy -1.129*
(0.561)
Major Power 0.512 0.215 -0.010
(0.413) (0.409) (0.842)
Rivalry 0.030 0.036 -0.492
(0.376) (0.374) (0.493)
Cold War 0.416 0.449 0.473 1.892
(0.520) (0.271) (0.290) (1.092)
Economic Development -0.125 -1.598* -0.528*
(0.090) (0.075) (0.202)
Oil Producer 0.485 0.642 1.598*
(0.415) (0.477) (0.553)
Constant -4.773* -4.376* -5.051* -2.441
(0.617) (0.512) (0.468) (1.804)
Log-likelihood -316.297 -314.076 -311.835 -151.948
Observations (Alliances) 6582 (223) 6424 (223) 6395 (223) 4896 (137)
Note: *p <0.05, two-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses. Point estimates and standard errors
were calculated from 10 draws using Rubin’s (1987) formula for multiple imputation to account for
uncertainty in the territorial threat instrumental variable.
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Alternative Models
We explore an alternative theoretical and empirical specification of our theory here. As a
reminder, our basic argument is that states form alliances to (a) counter threats or (b) per-
form other functions. In addition, alliances that were formed as an a-type can transform
into a b-type once the threat has subsided. This argument is especially important when
looking at the relationship between democracy and alliance violations; after states form an
a-type alliance that successfully deterred a threat, their now peaceful environment encour-
ages democratization and their alliance can either be re-purposed into a b-type alliance or
allowed to expire. In terms of alliance violations, only a-type alliance are “at-risk”, as b-type
alliances do not face external threats and are unlikely to be invoked.
While our theory and empirical specification suggests that regardless of original intent, all
alliances are likely to transform into b-types in the absence of current threats, it is possible
that the threat level at the time of alliance formation is the driving factor in subsequent
behavior. As alliances are written documents with specified obligations, the latter argument
would indicate that the initial threat environment is “baked in” to the bilateral document.
This argument, then, suggests that we should examine the threat level at formation to
probabilistically estimate which alliances are “at-risk” in the relevance equationy. Conversely,
our argument, suggests that the alliance’s purpose is more flexible, and its purpose (whether
a- or b-type) alliances are often re-purposed once the political environment has become
peaceful. Thus, the time-varying measure of threat that we use best captures our theoretical
argument.
Table A.5 reports two models—model 1 looks at just the threat level at the time of alliance
formation, and model 2 includes both the initial threat level at alliance formation and the
time-varying threat level. Model 1 allows us to evaluate whether the threat conditions present
when an alliance is formed drives future behavior, while model 2 controls for this initial threat
level while allowing for the theorized re-purposing of alliances in peaceful environments.
Starting with Model 1, and focusing on the relevance equation, it is clear that threat
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at Formation is not statistically significant, suggesting that the level of threat at alliance
formation is not a good predictor of whether an alliance is “at-risk” of violating their alliance.
Turning to Model 2, we see that territorial threat remains positive and statistically significant
even after accounting for the initial threat level at the time of alliance formation. Consistent
with our argument, this result indicates that alliances initially created to aggregate power
and deter a threat (a-types) are later re-purposed (made into (b-types)) once the political
environment becomes more peaceful. This result is consistent with outcomes identified by
previous research, such as the result that democratization takes place after alliances are
formed (e.g., Gibler and Wolford 2006). In other words, it is not that the threat level at
formation alone which determines how an alliance will be used throughout its existence, but
the level of threat currently facing the alliance.
It is also worth emphasizing that these results do not affect our primary substantive
take-aways in any way. Neither democracy nor change in Leader’s Societal Coalition are
statistically significant. Using Rainey’s negligible effect test, we continue to find that political
institutions exert no meaningful effect on whether an alliance is violated, once the political
environment is accounted for. The current political environment appears to primary factor
of whether a state is “at-risk” of violating an alliance, while political institutions have little
if any direct effect on their own.
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Table A.5: Political Environment, Democracy, and Alliance
Violations.
Formation Formation and Over Time
Time 1920-2001 1920-2001
Outcome Equation
Change in Leader’s Societal Coalition 5.039 5.327
(12.735) (5.829)
Democracy 1.034 1.305
(4.914) (2.483)
Change in International Power 6.801 3.105
(14.272) (4.243)
Change in Political Institutions 1.839 1.796
(1.762) (1.983)
Change in External Threat 1.946 0.882
(3.267) (1.916)
Formation of New Outside Alliance 6.071 2.569
(14.251) (3.230)
Asymmetry -0.984 -1.575
(1.349) (1.091)
Non-military Cooperation -2.364 -2.584*
(1.445) (1.271)
Ratification -0.342 1.371
(2.531) (3.175)
Military Cooperation 6.824 5.108
(8.592) (2.680)
Time -0.172 -0.136
(0.408) (0.370)
Time Squared -0.005 -0.002
(0.022) (0.011)
Time Cubed 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -5.275 -3.242*
(17.622) (1.444)
Relevance (At-risk) Equation
Territorial Threat 4.452*
(1.308)
Threat at Formation 0.085 -1.166
(1.370) (1.464)
Proportion of Democratic Borders -0.388* -0.292*
(0.130) (0.119)
Number of Borders 0.187* 0.139
(0.062) (0.077)
Major Power 0.413 0.398
(0.408) (0.616)
Rivalry 0.294 0.045
(0.434) (0.412)
Cold War 0.125 0.468
(0.263) (0.363)
Economic Development -0.175 -0.159
(0.093) (0.088)
Oil Producer 0.336 0.620
(0.418) (0.653)
Constant -4.701* -4.997*
(0.443) (0.674)
Log-likelihood -315.373 -307.144
Observations (Alliances) 6395 (223) 6395 (223)
Note: *p <0.05, two-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses. Point estimates and
standard errors in models 3 and 5 were calculated from 10 draws using Rubin’s
(1987) formula for multiple imputation to account for uncertainty in the territorial
threat and Threat at Formation instrumental variables.
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4 Stata Code to Implement the Split-population Logit
We include Stata code of the program we wrote to estimate the split-population logit. For
shorthand, DV represents the binary outcome variable, IVO represents the regressors in the
outcome equation, and IVR represents the regressors in the relevance equation. We outline
what each line of code does below.
Stata code:
program define spl lf, rclass
args lnf beta gamma
tempvar rel violate
quietly gen double ‘rel’ = 1/(1+exp(-‘gamma’))
quietly gen double ‘violate’ = 1/(1+exp(-‘beta’))
quietly replace ‘lnf’ = ‘lnf’ = ln((1-‘rel’)+(‘rel’*(1-‘violate’))) if $ML y1==0
quietly replace ‘lnf’ = ‘lnf’ = ln((‘rel’)*(‘violate’)) if $ML y1==1
end
ml model lf spl lf (DV = IVO) ( = IVR)
ml maximize
The first line defines that we are creating a program; the second and third line specifies the
arguments (coefficients to be specified), while the fourth and fifth lines creates two temporary
variables (i.e. the two equations). Next, the sixth and seventh lines specify the likelihoods
to be summed for Y = 0 and Y = 1, while line eight ends the program. Note that line
six, specifying the likelihood when Y = 0, treats the outcomes as coming from two distinct
processes, i.e. a mixture model, as Y = 0 can occur because either (a) the observation is
not relevant (“1-‘rel”’) or (b) the observation is relevant but there is no violation (“ ‘rel’*(1-
‘violate’)”). Y = 1 occurs only if the observation is relevant and a violation occurred.
Lines nine and ten implement the program and maximize the likelihood. The variables
are specified in line nine, with the equation from the first set of parentheses providing the
independent variables (on the right hand side of the equal sign) for the ‘beta’ argument and
the second set of parentheses providing the independent variables for the ‘gamma’ equation.
Any desired options, such as estimating clustered standard errors or choosing an alternative
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maximization algorithm, can be specified after the parentheses. Finally, the likelihood is
maximized in line ten.3
3As with other mixture models, it may be helpful to specify initial conditions to help identify the global
maximum.
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5 Alliance Violators
Table A.6 provides information about the cases of alliance violations. Alliance violation
data are from Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009). In addition to the State A (the violator),
State B (the state with whom the agreement is violated), and the year, we also report three
other pieces of information: State A’s level of territorial threat, whether there was a change
in leader’s societal coalition, and whether it is a democracy. Territorial threat is the mean
predicted probability from 10 draws of the estimated distribution of the maximum predicted
territorial threat from the model reported in Table A.1. Change in leader’s societal coalition
and democracy are from Leeds, Mattes and Vogel (2009).
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Table A.6: List of Abrogated Alliances.
State A State B Year Territorial ∆ in Leader’s Democracy
Threat Societal Coalition
Germany Russia 1933 .0134181 1 0
France Italy 1935 .0194196 1 1
Turkey Italy 1935 .0438603 0 0
Greece Italy 1935 .0658665 0 1
Belgium France 1936 .0074095 0 1
Italy Spain 1936 .0549720 0 0
Russia Czechoslovakia 1938 .2272077 0 0
France Czechoslovakia 1938 .1936811 0 1
Germany Austria 1938 .1865337 0 0
Russia Poland 1939 .279217 0 0
France Germany 1939 .2953013 0 1
Russia Finland 1939 .279217 0 0
Italy Albania 1939 .1462826 0 0
Russia France 1939 .279217 0 0
Russia Lithuania 1940 .5524079 0 0
Yugoslavia Romania 1940 .2755803 0 0
Russia Estonia 1940 .5524079 0 0
Germany Denmark 1940 .6677183 0 0
Thailand United Kingdom 1940 .0000000 0 0
Russia Latvia 1940 .5524079 0 0
Italy Russia 1941 .5609003 0 0
Germany Russia 1941 .5609003 0 0
Russia Iran 1941 .5609003 0 0
Italy Germany 1943 .259393 0 0
Russia Japan 1945 .5433966 0 0
Russia Turkey 1945 .5433966 0 0
Russia Yugoslavia 1949 .4135729 0 0
Albania Yugoslavia 1949 .0933776 0 0
Hungary Yugoslavia 1949 .0779969 0 0
Bulgaria Yugoslavia 1949 .0941740 0 0
Poland Yugoslavia 1949 .015158 0 0
Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia 1949 .0170141 0 0
Romania Yugoslavia 1949 .0794406 0 0
Pakistan Turkey 1950 .1850240 0 0
Egypt United Kingdom 1951 .2974145 0 0
Russia France 1955 .2527492 0 0
Russia United Kingdom 1955 .2527492 0 0
Egypt United Kingdom 1956 .3046337 0 0
Jordan United Kingdom 1957 .2971661 0 0
Iraq Jordan 1958 .176082 1 0
Iraq United Kingdom 1959 .1818257 0 0
Mali France 1960 .0829011 0 0
Egypt Yemen Arab Republic 1961 .2875846 0 0
Saudi Arabia Yemen Arab Republic 1962 .1485351 0 0
Nigeria United Kingdom 1962 .0385331 0 1
Saudi Arabia Egypt 1962 .1284466 0 0
France Morocco 1966 .0029804 0 1
Egypt Yemen Arab Republic 1967 .3355091 0 0
Libya United Kingdom 1970 .0069660 0 0
Madagascar France 1973 .0000000 1 0
Tunisia Libya 1974 .0015907 0 0
United Kingdom South Africa 1975 .0149923 0 1
Egypt Russia 1976 .1617086 0 0
Iraq Egypt 1977 .1838835 0 0
Somalia Russia 1977 .1971040 0 0
Uganda Sudan 1979 .1853800 1 0
Russia Pakistan 1979 .4478039 0 0
Iran United States 1979 .3403858 1 0
United States Taiwan 1980 .0682471 0 1
Syria Libya 1980 .1067835 0 0
Niger Libya 1981 .0030048 0 0
Chad Libya 1982 .1290733 1 0
Algeria Libya 1984 .0460337 0 0
Sudan Egypt 1985 .1514078 0 0
Morocco Libya 1986 .0980619 0 0
Malta Russia 1987 .0000000 1 1
Senegal Gambia 1989 .0008766 0 0
Jordan Saudi Arabia 1990 .1075147 0 0
Russia Iraq 1990 .2336497 0 0
Poland Russia 1991 .1297963 1 1
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